CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FORM NO. 51-44A

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•.	COUNTRY	Tibet/China				DATE D	ISTR. 31 I	Dec em ber	1952
	SUBJECT	1. Anti-Communis 2. Chinese Commu				NO. OF	PAGES 4		
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L		People's Party							

- 1. The People's Party is one of a number of loosely organized anti-Communist groups in Tibet which would cooperate in the event of a move to destroy the occupying Chinese forces. The leaders of the People's Party in Lhasa early renounced any attempt to keep a list of the many adherents to their party, but have a roster of leaders in the various districts of Tibet. Among the elements in the People's Party are the following:
 - a. Dhopto Rimpochhe, 36 years of age, is the leader of the warrior monks (dhoptos) of the Drepung, Sera and Ganden monasteries in Lhasa. Chhandzo of Drepung monastery is another leader in the People's Party.
 - b. In Lhasa, traders, carpenters, blacksmiths, tailors and other similar groups formed unions of a sort which for a time held meetings three or four times a week. By June 1952 these meetings, which brought together from a thousand to three thousand people, had been discontinued as attracting too much attention, but the organizations persisted.
 - c. In eastern Tibet (Sikang Province), people in the Batang (99-00, 30-00) and Ch*angtu (Chamdo, 97-07, 31-10) areas had been recruited for the People's Party and asked to report on Chinese Communist activities.

Activities of Ragashar Shapel

2. In the first half of 1952 Ragashar Shape enjoyed the confidence of the Chinese authorities in Lhasa, with whom he held conferences twice a week. In early April he drew up and presented a petition addressed to the Chinese Communist government and to the local authorities in Lhasa. The petition covered the following points:

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- a. The Dalai Lama should continue as supreme power in Tibet.
- b. Monastery estates should not be confiscated. 2
- c. Action should be taken against the hoarding of grain, which had produced a rise in the price of food.³
- d. If the Chinese chose to do so, they might follow the precedent of former Chinese regimes and keep a representative (amban) in Lhasa with a small staff, but Tibet, agriculturally poor, cannot support large numbers of Chinese troops. At most, two or three hundred bodyguards could be supported.
- e. Having liberated Tibet, for which the Tibetan people are grateful, it would be well if the Chinese would leave Tibet and return to China, inasmuch as at present no foreign powers threaten Tibet. The Tibetan people are simple and concerned only with earning a livelihood; thoughts of the outside world are beyond their poor intellects. Should foreign powers threaten Tibet, the Tibetans would call on the Chinese to protect them.
- f. Most Tibetans earn their livelihood by trading. Formerly their chief export was rool, which they sold to the British and Americans. Since the Chinese so kindly liberated Tibet, an embargo has been imposed on purchasing wool, and the traders consequently find themselves in difficult circumstances. Would the Chinese please buy the wool.

The Chinese made no reply to the petition. They did, however, go to the Kashag and demand the dismissal of the two Prime Ministers, claiming that the latter were behind the People's Party. 4

Kham Area

- 3. In the Kham area Chinese soldiers found it necessary to travel in groups of twenty or thirty for mutual protection against the Khambas, who were killing the Chinese as Communist enemies of Buddhism.
- 4. A lama made anti-Communist speeches in Ch'angtu. The Chinese threatened him with death and made him deliver a speech they had prepared for him.
- 5. The Chinese made Topgyal Pangdatshang governor of Kham in the hope that he could make Communist domination palatable to the people.
- 6. The Chinese took about two hundred children, aged from 8 to 15 years, from their homes in the area where both Chinese and Tibetan are spoken, and sent them to Gyangtse (89-38, 28-57), planning to train them and use them as interpreters. When the homesick children cried and wanted to go home, one of their number was beheaded as a warning.

The	following	Tibetans	were	believed	to be	acting a	as inf	ormers	for the	Chinese:	25
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	Chi	nese Forces in Tibet	
8.	In	May 1952 there were 50,000 Chinese troops in Tibet.9	
9.	Ţhe	following were the senior Chinese Communist army officers in Tibet:	
	a.	General CHANG Kuo-hua, in Lhasa.	
	b.	General FAN, commander of the 18 Division. 10	
	0.	Staff Officer LI, quartermaster, in Lhasa. 11	
	d.	TU Cha-tin, commander of the Chinese forces in Gyangtse. 12	
	е.	LIU Tse-mo, chief of intelligence in Gyangtse, handling both civil and military intelligence. He has direct contact with Peiping. 13	
•	1.	Comment.	7 25X
	0	in No explanation of his high standing with the Chinese has been given.	
	2.	Comment. The lamas say they will fight if the monastery lands are confiscated.	
	3.	Comment. The Tibetan Government took hoarding and the high prices by (1) distributing Chinese brick tea at a low price; (2) forbidding the manufacture of barley beer, which brought the price down from 110 to 75 tsang; and (3) lending barley to the poorer people only, accepting repayment in grain or money.	
	4.	Comment. The dismissal of Lukhang was reported in late May 1952, and the resignation of Lobsang Tashi was announced about a month later.	
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9.	Comment. Though this figure appears high, it must be born in mind that includes in Tibet a considerable portion of Sikang Province, as is evidenced by references to Batang and Chiangtu.
10.	Comment. No characters were provided for Chinese names 25X A news release from Peiping on 20 February 1952 listed FAN Ming as deputy political commissar for the Tibetan Military District.
11.	Comment. On 20 February 1952 LI Chueh was reported as chief of starr or the Tibetan Military District.
12.	Comment. A report which appeared in the New Delhi press with a kalimpong date line, 19 March 1952, gave TU Tu-ren (also without characters) as garrison commander in Gyangtse and Zhikatse.
13.	Comment. The 20 February 1952 press release included the name of LIU Chen-kuo, political director, Tibetan Military District.

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